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Abstract
Engineering studies demonstrate that traffic in dense downtown areas
obeys a stable functional relationship between average speed and density,
including a region of ’hypercongestion’ where flow decreases with density.
This situation can be described as queuing behind a bottleneck whose capac-
ity declines when the queue is large. We combine such a variable-capacity
bottleneck with Vickrey scheduling preferences for the special case where
there are only two possible levels of capacity. Solving the model leads to
several new insights, including that the marginal cost of adding a traveler is
especially sensitive to the lowest level of capacity reached. We analyze an
optimal toll, a coarse toll, and metering, showing substantial benefits from
using these policies to eliminate the period of reduced capacity. Under hy-
percongestion, all of these policies can be designed so that travelers gain
even without considering any toll revenues.
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1 Introduction
Recent studies of traffic in urban street networks carried out by Daganzo and his
associates establish a number of regularities that promise to be very useful for
economic modeling of urban congestion.1 Their findings apply to neighborhoods,
defined as uniformly congested parts of cities of dimensions comparable with a
trip length. In such neighborhoods, regularities among aggregate variables emerge
even though data from specific points appear quite chaotic.
Two such regularities are especially important for congestion modeling. First,
there is a well-defined inverse-U-shaped relationship between space-averaged flow
and vehicle density (the latter is proportional to occupancy, the number of cars
traveling in the neighborhood). Second, the trip completion rate is proportional to
the space-averaged flow.
In contrast to the microscopic level of detail involved in looking at individual
streets and individual cars, we may consider neighborhoods as macroscopic enti-
ties. The observed regularities make it possible to abstract from the microscopic
complexity of actual traffic networks in order to offer a remarkably simple picture
of congestion at the macroscopic neighborhood level. Cars embarking on trips en-
ter a neighborhood at some rate, adding to the network density there. Cars move
ahead, passing points in the network according to a flow rate that on average de-
pends only on network density. Trips are completed and cars leave the system at a
rate that is proportional to the instantaneous flow. This last property is extremely
useful, enabling us to identify flow with quantity demanded. Thus it frees us from
having to take into account that trips have varying lengths and that changing the
flow rate may change the distribution of trip lengths.
The relationship between flow and density identifies regions of congestion and
hypercongestion, namely the rising and falling portions of the inverse-U flow-
density relationship. Under congested conditions, flow increases with density but
less than linearly. As more cars enter the system, flow increases at a diminishing
rate until it reaches the maximum flow. Above this point, additional traffic in the
system will decrease flow; this phenomenon is called hypercongestion.2
Conservation of vehicles dictates that at any point in time, the rate of change
in occupancy is the difference between the instantaneous entry and the exit rates.
Hypercongestion is thus inevitably a transient phenomenon. For hypercongestion
to occur there must have been a period with entry at a rate higher than the maxi-
mum flow rate, but that rate cannot continue indefinitely as the occupancy would
then increase indefinitely. More generally, it is necessary to consider intra-day dy-
namics in order to understand congestion and hypercongestion in a demand peak.
1See Daganzo (2007); Geroliminis and Daganzo (2008).
2In the engineering literature, these two regimes are called "uncongested" and "congested"
flow, respectively.
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To consider intra-day dynamics, we must take into account that travelers have
preferences regarding the timing of their trips, for which we use a formulation that
has become standard. We also need to determine the relationship between when
trips begin and when they end. For this, we make an assumption that may appear
innocuous but is actually quite strong: namely, that trips are completed in the se-
quence in which they are initiated. This first-in-first-out (FIFO) principle is not
necessarily consistent with a microscopic picture of the evolution of individual
travel speeds, but it is at least as plausible as several alternative assumptions that
have been made to make analysis of hypercongestion tractable.3 Without FIFO,
analysis would become extremely complex because one would have to explicitly
depict separate routes for each traveler and their interactions on a network; but
general features of the model should remain because we would still have equi-
librium conditions equating costs for a given traveler at different times, and the
feature of capacity reduction when vehicle density becomes large.
This description of congestion in an urban neighborhood brings us close to the
highly successful “bottleneck model” of Vickrey (1969). As shown by Vickrey
and further elaborated by Fargier (1983), Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (hereafter
ADL) (1990,1993,1998), and others, the model depicts Nash equilibrium where
travelers adjust their departure times endogenously, accounting for aversion to
inconvenient schedules as well as to travel time. In the bottleneck model, there
is a queue that waits behind a deterministic bottleneck. But there is no hyper-
congestion: the bottleneck has constant capacity, hence implies a constant trip
completion rate once a queue exists. Other models have considered time-varying
capacities (Zhang et al., 2010) and so can analyze exogenous temporary imbal-
ances between inflow and capacity, but still do not depict a situation where greater
inflow results in lower outflow.
In our model, by contrast, there is a pool of cars traveling, whose trip times
are affected by the system’s limited processing capacity just as though they were
in a queue. (Indeed, at a micro level they typically are in queues at various inter-
sections.) But the flow rate from this "queue" declines with occupancy, producing
hypercongestion. Thus we can analyze an apparently complex macroscopic sys-
tem similarly to a bottleneck with variable capacity. This equivalence between the
two problems is noted by Geroliminis and Levinson (2009). In comparison to their
analysis, we simplify the dependency of flow on occupancy, enabling us to solve
the model explicitly. Specifically, we assume the bottleneck has two capacities,
the lower one being activated when occupancy reaches a certain level. Travelers
3Two such alternatives include that trip time depends solely on the density at the end of the
trip (Small and Chu, 2003), and that trip distances are randomly distributed and unknown to the
traveler (Arnott, 2011). Other papers making similar assumptions to that of Small and Chu (2003)
include Henderson (1981), Mahmassani and Herman (1984), Chu (1995) and Yang and Huang
(1997).
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understand this and, in Nash equilibrium, account for it in their departure-time
decisions.
Our results demonstrate that indeed travel costs rise much more severely with
demand for travel than in the conventional bottleneck model, and thus there are
correspondingly greater gains to policies such as capacity reduction and dynamic
pricing that relieve congestion. Where the standard bottleneck model shows the
benefits associated with reduced queueing, our model shows additional gains as-
sociated with avoiding capacity drop. The latter become especially visible in an-
other policy analyzed here: metering, i.e. use of traffic signals to restrain the rate
of inflow to certain parts of the road network.4 The additional gains associated
with avoiding capacity drop also mean that the average cost of trips will decrease.
In fact, we obtain the somewhat surprising feature that if demand is not perfectly
inelastic, optimally regulating hypercongestion may entail increasing traffic—it
will definitely do so in the case of metering, and will do so in the case of tolling if
congestion (absent pricing) is especially severe.
The nature of hypercongestion and how to deal with it in economic models has
been the subject of a long discussion: its existence has been generally acknowl-
edged but its significance debated. Partly this is because hypercongestion has been
defined from microscopic data, but the interest in it arises from macroscopic phe-
nomena. Partly it is because hypercongestion can be defined in terms of a static
speed-flow relationship that entails what is effectively a backward bending supply
curve (e.g. Walters, 1961). But, as we have just seen, hypercongestion is an in-
herently dynamic phenomenon. Our approach deals explicitly with the dynamic
macroscopic properties that are the main source of interest in economic analysis
of very congested systems.
We proceed by defining and analyzing the variable-capacity model just de-
scribed in Sections 2 and 3. We then consider and compare a variety of policies
in Section 4, namely an optimal time-dependent toll, an optimal coarse toll (with
just one toll level), and metering of system inflow so as to eliminate hypercon-
gestion. Section 5 discusses extension to the case of elastic demand. We perform
numerical simulations in Section 6 and section 7 draws conclusions for policy and
for research.
2 Model setup
We consider a continuum of N travelers all making trips. Each traveler must
choose a departure time; the resulting arrival time is determined by the queueing
4When there are multiple user groups accessing the road with limited capacity at different
points, metering can also be used to reduce aggregate user cost by better allocating priority among
these groups (Shen and Zhang, 2010).
3
system and thus depends on the aggregate departure schedule. We denote cumu-
lative departures by R (t), which has derivative (t)  0 almost everywhere. All
travelers depart eventually, i.e. R (1) = N: Similarly, we denote cumulative exits
by A (t), which is weakly increasing and satisfies A ( 1) = 0 and A (1) = N:
Arrivals occur later than departures, i.e. R (t)  A (t). The number of travelers
Q (t) in the system at any time is the number who have departed less the number
who have arrived: Q (t) = R (t)  A (t) :
For simplicity, we will ignore any travel time not related to congestion; adding
free-flow time or cost is a trivial extension. Therefore the first time anybody de-
parts is also the first time anybody arrives, i.e. there is no delay for the first person:
formally, inf ftjR (t) > 0g = inf ftjA (t) > 0g.
The queueing system obeys the first-in-first-out (FIFO) rule. This means that
the traveler departing at time t, with position R (t) in the sequence of departures,
has the same position in the sequence of arrivals. We denote the time of arrival as
a (t)  A 1 [R (t)]. (Because A (t) is weakly increasing in t, this inverse exists
wherever A0 > 0, to which region we restrict attention.) The travel time for a
traveler departing at time t is the horizontal distance between the functions R ()
and A () ; i.e. it is a (t)  t.
The FIFO assumption guarantees that the later entrants will never exit before
the earlier ones. However, it does not imply a lack of effect of later travelers
on earlier ones. On the contrary, and in distinction from the standard bottleneck
model, they have a profound effect as now described. In short, this effect occurs
because later travelers affect the length of the queue and therefore the processing
rate that applies while the traveler in question is waiting in that queue, even though
they are behind that traveler in position. Thus, we should not think of the queueing
system as a literal queue, but rather a system where later entrants can influence
earlier ones. For example, in the areawide setting described in the introduction,
they might do so by blocking intersections that the earlier entrants will use to get
to their exits.
The delay for each traveler is governed by a processing rate   0 for exiting
the queueing system. In the Vickrey (1969) bottleneck model,  is a constant, so
the function A () is very simple: it has derivative  whenever there is a queue.
But here, following Geroliminis and Levinson (2009) and Gonzalez and Daganzo
(2011), we assume that the processing rate at time s is a function ofQ (s), i.e.,  =
 (Q (s)) and that A0 (s) =  (Q (s)) whenever there is a queue. Although  is a
temporary processing rate, we refer to it as "capacity," and to our model as having
variable or endogenous capacity, in much the same way that flow breakdown at
real highway bottlenecks is often described as a capacity reduction.
For a traveler entering the queueing system at time t, there are Q (t) earlier
travelers in who must be processed before this given traveler can exit the system.
They are processed at rate  [Q (s)] over the succeeding times s. Therefore arrival
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time a (t) is defined implicitly by
Q (t) =
a(t)Z
t
 [Q (s)] ds: (1)
Equation (1) shows that any traveler entering between times t and a (t) can influ-
ence the travel time of the traveler entering at t, via the function Q (s).
The consistency required by (1) makes the model intractable to solve in gen-
eral. As a result, researchers investigating hypercongestion have replaced (1) by
something simpler, for example letting Q (s) inside the integral be replaced by
Q (t) or by Q [a (t)] (see footnote 3). In this paper, we solve the problem without
compromising the mutual interactions of travelers in (1) by assuming a particu-
larly simple form for  (Q). Namely, we assume  (Q) is piecewise constant,
taking just three values: full capacity  0; reduced capacity  1; or zero:
 (Q) =
8<:
 0; Q  Q0
 1; Q0 < Q < QJ
0; Q  QJ ;
where Q0 is a critical queue size above which capacity drops and QJ is the queue
size where vehicles stop moving entirely, corresponding to the jam density in a
traffic flow model. We consider only values of N for which Q never reaches jam
density, since otherwise we would have infinite travel delays and the model would
break down; thus we actually need deal with only two values for  .
Having described congestion technology, we now turn to behavior. Again, we
will need simplifying assumptions in order to obtain a tractable model and results
that are amenable to interpretation. First, travelers are identical. Second, travelers
care about the timing of their departure and arrival with as expressed by a user
cost of the -- type formulated by Vickrey (1969), estimated by Small (1982),
and used by numerous authors since.5 Specifically, the user cost associated with
departing at time t and arriving at time a is
c (t; a) =   (a  t) +  max (t   a; 0) +  max (a  t; 0) ;
where  is the value of time,  is the cost of earliness,  is the cost of lateness,
and t is the preferred arrival time. Like most authors using this behavioral model,
we require 0 <  <  < , assumptions supported empirically (Small, 1982), in
order to produce a sensibly shaped peak period. We normalize t = 0 at no loss
of generality.
5For example, Fargier (1983), Arnott et al. (1990, 1993). For useful reviews, see Arnott et al.
(1998) or Small and Verhoef (2007).
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We look for a Nash equilibrium in which the macroscopic state of the system,
arising from the aggregate of individual scheduling decisions, leaves each traveler
achieving the lowest possible cost given that state. Given identical travelers, this
means that in equilibrium, user cost takes a constant value for all departure times
for which the departure rate  is positive, and no lower values elsewhere.
3 Unregulated equilibrium
It is straightforward to show that in equilibrium with no toll or metering, depar-
tures and arrivals all take place during a common interval [t0; t1]. The reasoning is
identical to that in the standard bottleneck model (ADL 1990). The first and last
departures (at times t0 and t1, respectively) provide congestion-free travel, while
in between the queue is always positive. The first and last departure times are
related by the equal-cost condition for first and last travelers: t1 =  t0.
The form of the cost function implies that the arrival time a (t) and delay
[a (t)  t] are piecewise-linear functions of departure time, governed solely by
cost parameters ; ; and : For early departure times, i.e. those for which
a (t) < 0; average cost [  (a (t)  t)    a (t)] is constant, which requires
that a () be linear with slope
a0 (t) = = (  )  a0E:
A similar condition for departures corresponding to late arrival a (t) > 0 yields
slope
a0 (t) = = ( + )  a0L:
Accounting for boundary conditions, then, the arrival rate between times t0 and t1
is
a (t) =

t0 + a
0
E  (t  t0) ; t < tM
a0L  (t  tM) ; t > tM (2)
where tM  (=) t0 is the departure time leading to arrival at t  0. Note that
travel delay, a (t)   t; first grows at rate a0E   1 = = (  ) and then declines
at rate 1  a0L = = ( + ) :
We now derive a departure pattern consistent with this equilibrium arrival pat-
tern, as well as with congestion technology. We can find the equilibrium departure
rate  (t) by differentiating (1), keeping in mind that the queue is Q (t) = R (t) 
A (t), the departure rate is R0 (t) =  (t), and the arrival rate is A0 [t] =  [Q (t)].
This yields, almost everywhere, that
 (t) = a0 (t)   [Q (a (t))] : (3)
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Table 1: Base parameters for numerical examples
Assumed Parameters: Derived quantities
 1.0  0.4
 0.5 a0E 2.0
 2 a0L 1/3
 0 1 N c1 5.0
 1 0.5 N c2 9.0
Q0 2.0 N c3 11.0
Note that the equilibrium departure rate at time t depends on the exit rate at time
a (t); this is why the model with time-varying capacities is intractable in general.
With our simplifying assumptions, there are only two possible values for a0, as
seen from (2), and two for  : hence there are just four possible values of .
It turns out there are three distinct possible equilibrium patterns, each arising
for successively larger values of N . We name them Regimes 1, 2, and 3. The
math involved in determining these regimes is straightforward but tedious, and is
given in the appendix. Here we provide an overview.
3.1 Regime 1
The first regime is where demand N is sufficiently low that only congestion and
not hypercongestion occurs. The reduced capacity is not activated and so this is
the standard bottleneck model (Arnott et al., 1993), depicted in Figure 1a using the
parameters shown in Table 1. As is well known, in that case t0 =   (=)N= 0,
t1 =   (=) t0, and the maximum queue length is N=, where   = ( + )
is a measure of the strength of scheduling costs (those parts of user cost related to
preferences over schedules). The condition ensuring that the low capacity is not
activated is the one ensuring that maximum queue length does not reach Q0:
N  N1  Q0=:
The departure rate is defined almost everywhere by
 (t) =

a0E 0; t 2 (t0; tM)
a0L 0; t 2 (tM ; t1) : (4)
All travelers achieve the same cost in equilibrium, equal to the cost for the first
traveler departing at time t0: Hence total cost as a function of N is N2= 0; mar-
ginal cost (its derivative) is 2N= 0, which is exactly twice the average cost.
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Figure 1: Cumulative departure and arrival patterns for various N: (a) Regime 1
(N=5); (b) Regime 2 (N=8); (c) Regime 3 (N=12)
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3.2 Regime 2
When N > N1, the lower capacity  1 is activated over some non-zero time inter-
val. Denote by tdrop < tM the first departure time after which a traveler will be
processed at the slower rate, i.e. the first time when Q [a (tdrop)] = Q0. Similarly,
denote by tlift the next departure time after that for which a departing traveler will
again be processed at the faster rate, meaning that Q [a (tlift)] is again Q0. If N is
not too large, so that capacity drops only for a brief period, then tlift < a (tdrop);
this defines Regime 2, which is depicted in Figure 1b.
Whenever N > N1, some travelers now have to account for the fact that the
arrival rate will become slow before they complete their trips, and hence their
equilibrium condition (3) involves the lower processing rate  1: (These travel-
ers are sandwiched between others whose marginal condition involves the higher
rate.) In Regime 2, all of them arrive early. Thus the full set of departure rates is
 (t) =
8>><>>:
a0E 0; t 2 [t0; tdrop]
a0E 1; t 2 (tdrop; tlift)
a0E 0; t 2 [tlift; tM ]
a0L 0; t 2 (tM ; t1]:
(5)
Note that there are only three distinct rates here, since one rate occurs twice. Note
also that the first and last departure rates are identical to those of Regime 1.
The arrival rate, A0 (t) ; has just two values,  0 and  1; the slopes of the lower
curve in the figure. The first (high) value prevails until the queue builds to value
Q0 and again after it has fallen back to Q0; the second (low) value prevails in
between. The times when these kinks occur can be derived geometrically (relative
to t0) from the diagram, since we know the slopes  and A0 as just described;
these times are given in the Appendix, along with the corresponding numbers of
travelers Q in the system at each time. Finally, time t0 is determined from the
condition that all travelers are accommodated, i.e. that traveler N departs at time
t1. As shown in the appendix, the result is
t0 =   N
 01
+
Q0
 0
 
(  )  +  1
(6)
=   N
 01
+

1
 01
  a
0
e 1= 
1 + a0e 1=

Q0
where    0    1 and
 01   0
(  )  +  1
 +  1
(7)
can be interpreted as an intermediate capacity, lying between  1 and  0.
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It is straightforward to verify that t0 in Regime 2 occurs earlier than in Regime
1. The marginal external cost N= 01 is larger than in Regime 1, and smaller than
it would be if capacity were always equal to  1 (namely N= 1); this observation
is important in the comparison with Regime 3.
3.3 Regime 3
As N grows, the time of reduced capacity lasts longer, and for large enough N
we will find that tlift > a (tdrop). This condition defines Regime 3. It implies
that some travelers experience only the reduced capacity for their entire trip, since
they arrive before the time when capacity goes back to its higher level. We show
in the Appendix that this occurs when N exceeds the critical value
N2  N1 +

  

  
 1
+ 1

Q0 (8)
which is always greater thanN1. There are two possibilities: if tlift < tM (Regime
3a), then (5) again applies, with just three distinct departure rates. Otherwise
(Regime 3b), all four possible departure rates occur:
 (t) =
8>><>>:
a0E 0; t 2 [t0; tdrop]
a0E 1; t 2 (tdrop; tM ]
a0L 1; t 2 (tM ; tlift)
a0L 0; t 2 [tlift; t1] :
(9)
Regime 3b is shown in Figure 1c.
The appendix also shows that in regime 3, the first departure time t0 is
t0 =   N
 1


1 

 
 0
 + 

+
 
 1
  


Q0
N

: (10)
The factor in square brackets can be shown to lie between 0 and 1; thus the first
departure time is again later than would be the case if capacity were  1 throughout
the entire period, which would be   (=)N= 1.
3.4 Implications of unregulated equilibrium
There are two notable features of the unregulated equilibrium in our model.
3.4.1 Time stretching
First, the effect of activating the lower capacity is to stretch the peak period, with
the beginning and ending looking just like they did before except taking place fur-
ther from the desired arrival time. This is more easily seen by holding N constant
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while decreasing  1, i.e. while exacerbating the decline in processing rate that
occurs when vehicle density is high. Figure 2 shows the cumulative departure and
arrival patterns for three such values of  1 (with other parameters as in Table 1).
As  1 decreases, the delay times in the middle of the rush hour (the horizontal
distance between the two curves) becomes larger, even though the queue length
itself (the vertical distance) does not. To maintain equilibrium, the earliest and
latest travelers suffer correspondingly higher scheduling costs.
Figure 3 zooms in on the early rush hour, namely the departures and arrivals
of the first 2Q0 travelers. The patterns are nearly identical but displaced to earlier
times as N increases. Similarly, we can see from Figure 2 that the patterns for the
last 1:5Q0 travelers are unaffected by  except for being displaced to slightly later
times when  is smaller.
3.4.2 Race to the bottom
The second notable feature is that at the margin, the cost of adding a traveler to the
system is governed ultimately by the lowest capacity. By "ultimately" we mean
once the transitional Regime 2 has been passed through. As seen from the above
expressions for t0, the average cost of a traveler, ac   t0, is a linear function
of N within any given regime, whose slope increases from one regime to the next:
ac (N) =  t0 =
8><>:

 0
N; N  N1
ac (N1) +

 01
(N  N1) ; N1 < N  N2
ac (N2) +

 1
(N  N2) ; N2 < N .
(11)
(Recall we assume throughout that N is smaller than the value that would cause
the queue to reach jam density.)
The marginal external congestion cost (mecc), i.e. marginal cost less average
cost, is determined solely by the term that is linear in N ,
mecc = N
d [ac (N)]
dN
=
N
 k
(12)
where k = 0; 01; 1 varies by regime. This is just like the standard bottleneck
model except with capacity replaced by  k. We note in passing that if demand has
nonzero elasticity and the only policy tool available is a uniform toll, its optimal
level is mecc.
The average and marginal cost functions implied by 11 are illustrated in Fig-
ure 4 for the case  1 = 1=3. The figure also shows what they would be if there
were no capacity reduction. Note that average and marginal costs increase non-
linearly; average cost is convex and marginal cost is discontinuous at N1 and N2.
This property also characterizes many static models, but not the dynamic model
11
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Figure 2: Cumulative departure and arrival patterns for Regime 2, N = 8: (a)
 1 = 1; (b)  1 = 2=3; (c)  1 = 1=3
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Figure 3: Cumulative departure and arrival patterns for earliest travelers at various
values of N:
most commonly used in economic analysis of congestion, which is the standard
bottleneck model (our Regime 1). Thus, our model gives a dynamic justification
for the common assertion — typically based on a static model — that congestion
becomes especially sensitive to traffic levels under highly congested conditions.
We conjecture that this conclusion is robust with respect to the inclusion of
many capacity levels. More specifically, we conjecture that if the model were
extended to include many possible values of successively lower capacity, then av-
erage cost would still be a convex function such that marginal external congestion
cost would be increasing; the average cost would depend in a complex way on the
whole range of activated capacities.
4 Policies
Hypercongestion can be reduced or eliminated by at least two types of policies.
One is pricing, designed to reduce departure rates enough to keep the maximum
queue length below the critical value Q0. The other is metering, designed to move
the queue outside of the region where it produces hypercongestion. For exam-
ple, if the model represents areawide congestion within a central business district,
vehicles might be allowed into that district at a reduced rate, with the resulting
queues regulated in such a way that they do not interfere with any moving traffic.
Of the many possible policies of these types we consider the three shown in
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Figure 4: Average and marginal cost functions for  1 = 1=3
Table 2: Policies considered
Policy objective Tolling Metering
No queue Optimal dynamic toll
No hypercongestion Coarse toll to remove hy-
percongestion
Metering to remove hyper-
congestion
Table 2. The optimal dynamic toll addresses all costs of queuing while the other
two (a coarse toll and metering) are aimed mainly at eliminating hypercongestion.
4.1 Optimal dynamic toll
The dynamic toll that produces the lowest average cost (and thereby maximizes
welfare given perfectly inelastic demand) has already been described by ADL
(1990). We know this because the same reasoning applies here as in the Vickrey
model. The optimal toll must eliminate all queuing, which is an unnecessary
cost to the system, while allowing travelers to fully utilize the capacity of the
bottleneck in order to minimize their aggregate user costs. Since the total number
of travelers is fixed, it is only the time pattern of the toll that matters: it can be
increased or decreased uniformly without affecting the resulting equilibrium. For
concreteness, and following convention, we assume the toll is zero for the first and
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last travelers. We also assume that each traveler cares only about the "inclusive
price", defined as user cost plus toll.
This toll and the resulting departure and arrival patterns (which are identical)
are well known. The toll is time-varying and replaces exactly the queuing cost
that would have occurred in a hypothetical unregulated equilibrium with capac-
ity  0. Average revenue per traveler is (1=2) N= 0. Travelers have the same
scheduling costs as they would in that equilibrium, but the corresponding hypo-
thetical queuing costs are replaced by the cost (to them) of tolling. Thus, relative
to that hypothetical high-capacity equilibrium, travelers perceive the same total
price with or without the toll policy in place. But of course toll payments are now
balanced by revenues, which are counted as a benefit.
Thus, there are two resulting sources of gain from this policy. First, capacity
can be maintained at the high level  0: This enables all travelers to be accommo-
dated during a shorter time interval, having duration N= 0. Second, even relative
to a bottleneck with that higher capacity  0, all queuing cost is eliminated. That
cost is exactly half the total cost in the hypothetical unregulated equilibrium, or
(1=2) N= 0 per traveler. The two cost savings combined are found by subtract-
ing the average cost with optimal tolling, ac(tolled) = (1=2) N= 0, from that
given by (11):
ac(unregulated)  ac(tolled) (13)
=
8>><>>:

2 
0
N; N  N1

 
01
  
 
0

(N  N1) + 2 0N; N1 < N < N2

 01
  
 0

(N2  N1) +   0 1 (N  N2) +

2 0
N; N2  N .
As noted earlier, the average revenue from the optimal toll with fixed capacity
 0 is equal to the last term in each of these expressions. Hence, the expressions
show how welfare gain is divided between travelers and the recipient of revenues.
The fraction of gain accruing to travelers is zero forN  N1 and it increases asN
increases. The possibility of having substantial gains accrue directly to travelers
contrasts sharply with the standard bottleneck model and also with the typical
static model, which assumes a sharply convex relationship between travel time
and flow.
4.2 Metering to remove hypercongestion
Suppose inflow to the system can be metered to remain below a certain rate, and
the resulting queue can be held where it is not part of the queue length that de-
termines capacity. Suppose further that FIFO applies in the metered queue. Then
15
hypercongestion can be eliminated, either by limiting the metering rate to  0 or
less or at least by setting it so that the resulting queue within the system (the un-
metered queue) never exceeds Q0. Assume further that travelers view waiting in
either the metered or unmetered queue identically, with cost per minute . Then
the system is converted into the equivalent of a standard bottleneck model whose
bottleneck capacity is  0 and whose queue length is the sum of the metered and
unmetered queues. In the language of areawide congestion, the travel time is the
sum of time waiting in the metered queue and time spent within the congested
area (the latter represented in the model by time waiting in the unmetered queue).
If storage in the metered queue is costless, then it is optimal to assure that no
hypercongestion occurs since, if it did, travel times and scheduling costs could be
reduced by decreasing the metering rate. Thus we already have the solution to
this policy, which is the departure pattern (4) originally presented as Regime 1,
but now applying for any value of N . The welfare gain per traveler, relative to
the unregulated equilibrium, is given by the difference in average costs, which is
easily obtained from equations (11):
ac(unregulated)  ac(metered) (14)
=
8>><>>:
0; N  N1

 
01
  
 0

(N  N1) ; N1 < N  N2

 01
  
 0

(N2  N1) +   0 1 (N  N2) ; N2 < N .
The welfare gain given in (13), from the optimal dynamic toll, can thus be
decomposed into two parts. The first part is that which results from the elimination
of hypercongestion; this part is the same as the welfare gain (14) from optimal
metering, and it accrues directly to travelers. The second part is N= (2 0); it is
due to eliminating the queue that remains even when capacity does not drop, and it
accrues to the recipient of revenues. Thus, if travelers ignore the use of revenues,
they are indifferent between optimal tolling and metering.
4.3 Coarse toll to remove hypercongestion
The optimal toll varies continuously over time and so one may seek a simpler
toll policy. This section considers a so-called coarse toll, which is a toll that
has a single level, here denoted  ; that is applied to arrivals (i.e. exits from the
bottleneck) during some interval which we denote [t+; t ] : The welfare benefits
of such a toll, for the case of constant capacity, have been described elsewhere
(Arnott et al., 1990; Laih, 1994, 2004; Fosgerau, 2011). Here, we analyze the
case of variable capacity.
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In either case, the outcome of a coarse toll depends on assumptions regarding
queueing technology. The issue is how to deal with the discontinuity that exists
at time t  when the toll is lifted, which may produce an equilibrium with massed
departures. Arnott et al. (1990) allow such massed departures to occur and assume
they are placed randomly in the queue position. A simpler approach, adopted by
Fosgerau (2011), is to assume that travelers who will arrive after time t  queue
separately while those paying the toll are being preferentially processed, even
though this violates FIFO. In other words, people who don’t want to pay the toll
can enter the system and queue up behind each other while waiting for the toll to
be removed at t . (There is some realism to this idea: in Stockholm, drivers have
been reported waiting for the toll to be reduced before entering the city, even while
others enter and pay the toll.) Fosgerau (2011) shows that in the case of constant
capacity, and with the toll level set within certain limits, the departure and arrival
patterns of those not paying the toll will then be exactly as in the unregulated
equilibrium, while those paying the toll will encounter zero travel times at times
t+ and t  and so adopt a departure and arrival pattern that is just like they would
if they were in a Regime 1 system with starting and ending times t+ and t .
To achieve this solution, we set t+ and t  so that t+ = t  and t++ =
 t0 = N= 0: That is, we set
t+ =
1


   N
 0

; (15)
t  =
1


N
 0
  

(16)
Then in equilibrium the number of travelers paying the toll is  0 (t    t+) =
N   ( 0/); they depart and arrive during [t+; t ] and face inclusive price  t0,
the same as for other travelers. This is the same inclusive price that is paid by all
in unregulated equilibrium, which shows that just as with an optimal toll, travelers
are indifferent between a coarse toll and an unregulated equilibrium if they ignore
revenues.
Figure 5 depicts the equilibrium under such a coarse toll, indicating actual cu-
mulative departures and arrivals (solid lines) as well as the intervening departures
that would occur in an untolled equilibrium (dotted lines). Note that some of the
untolled group depart before some of the latest of the tolled group, yet arrive after
them, since the tolled group receives preferential treatment; both contribute to the
queue simultaneously for a while, as shown at the top of the figure. These two
groups of travelers are shown separately as two dashed line segments. The one
for late untolled travelers is placed at the top of the figure to show how it fits into
the graph that applies for an untolled equilibrium (the outer triangle including the
dotted line). But the actual cumulative departure rate is the solid line segment con-
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Figure 5: Coarse toll: cumulative departures and arrivals
necting these two dashed lines, which has slope equal to the sum of their slopes.
Since our solution eliminates hypercongestion, it has the same properties as
the fixed-capacity coarse toll analyzed by Fosgerau (2011).6 The toll level that
maximizes welfare is also the one that maximizes revenues  0 (t    t+) = N 
 2  0

, which is
   N
2 0
: (17)
In this case exactly half the travelers pay the toll, providing total revenue N2=(4 0)
which is half that from an optimal toll. Average cost is (3=4)N= 0, which is mid-
way between that from optimal tolling and that in the unregulated equilibrium.
We show in the appendix that this solution is valid, in the sense that the maximal
queue never exceeds Q0, provided N  2N1. If N > 2N1, it is not possible to
eliminate hypercongestion using a coarse toll.
6There are other systems where capacity breakdowns may be avoided by giving some people
the chance to pay for the ability to bypass service queues. One is internet service, where providers
have proposed breaking "net neutrality" by giving preferred customers faster processing times.
Another is electricity provision, where customers can voluntarily submit to peak pricing in lieu
of being subject to blackouts. The analogy holds even if priority access is granted based on some
criterion other than paying a toll: as shown by Fosgerau (2011), creating an unpriced but restricted
express lane ("fast lane") can replicate the patterns of departures and queuing delays produced by
a coarse toll.
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The coarse toll provides a welfare gain consisting of two parts: that from
removing hypercongestion, which we already calculated as (14), and that from
further reduced queuing, which is the same as revenues. Thus total welfare gain
per traveler is
ac(unregulated)  ac(coarse toll) (18)
=
8>><>>:
N
4 0
; N  N1

 
01
  
 0

(N  N1) + N4 0 ; N1 < N  min fN2; 2N1g

 01
  
 0

(N2  N1) +   0 1 (N  N2) +

4 0
N; N2 < N  2N1
Equivalently, the welfare gain per traveler from replacing optimal metering by the
optimal coarse toll is N=(4 0), again provided N  2N1.
5 Elastic demand
Our analysis thus far has taken total traffic volume N to be exogenous. As a
consequence, there is an indeterminacy in the optimal toll: only its pattern matters,
not its absolute level. However, if demand is a less than perfectly inelastic function
of inclusive price (average cost plus toll), this indeterminacy is removed as the toll
level now controls the total traffic volume. We already know from Arnott et al.
(1993) that the bottleneck model leads to a very neat division of the toll into a
component related to timing of departures (the same as derived earlier) and one
related to the total amount of traffic. This latter component is a constant equal
to the marginal external cost of congestion, mecc, defined as the derivative of the
average cost when viewed as a function of N . (Other external costs, such as from
air pollution, can be added to mecc.)
Regardless of what policy we consider, however, a new feature arises in our
model because these policies reduce average cost more than in the constant-capacity
model: specifically, by (14) due to eliminating hypercongestion. This affects the
inclusive price resulting from a given scenario. This will tend to increase total
traffic volume, analogously to the "rebound effect" from implementing energy ef-
ficiency regulation: by making operation cheaper, increased use is attracted.
For each of the policies described here, we can calculate the conditions under
which total traffic will increase due to the policy. This occurs whenever the extra
monetary cost imposed by a toll level is less than (14). For the metering policy,
there is no monetary cost so this condition always holds: metering will increase
total traffic. For the optimal toll including mecc = (1=2)= 0, total traffic will
increase if mecc is less than (14).
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For the coarse toll, the situation is more complicated because the toll is applied
only to part of the peak period; if its level is raised in order to suppress elastic
demand, the time pattern will also be distorted. Rather than solve that rather
messy problem, we consider adding a uniform toll (covering all times) on top of
the coarse toll. We have already seen that for this policy, ac (N) = (3=4)N= 0
and therefore mecc  d [ac (N)] =dN = (3=4)= 0. Thus traffic is increased
whenever this value is less than (14). Note that the greater N , the more likely
traffic will be increased by either an optimal or a coarse toll, since (14) rises with
N whereas mecc does not.
6 Simulation study
In order to determine how our model behaves when there are more than two lev-
els of non-zero capacity, we use numerical simulation. We have implemented a
simulation model using the values (; ; ) = (1; 2; 4) : Capacity is a decreasing
step function of the queue length, starting at  0 = 5 and declining by half at each
queue length in the set f2000; 4000; 6000; :::g.
A simulation run begins with an arbitrarily chosen time of the first departure,
t0. At each iteration, it uses the queue pattern from the preceding iteration to com-
pute the cumulative departures R, then recalculates the queue dynamically to de-
termine the cumulative exit rate A at each succeeding point in time. Convergence
is obtained when an iteration step does not change the queue length significantly
at any time. The value of t solving R (t) = A (t) is then found numerically, and
the corresponding value ofR is taken to be the amount of total trafficN consistent
with the chosen t0.
Figure 6 shows the cumulative departures and arrivals for a single run with
departures starting at time  5000: The simulation finds the corresponding total
traffic volume to be 17248. The figure clearly shows how kinks in the departure
rate are related to kinks in the arrival rate at the corresponding time of arrival, as
well as to the change from early to late arrival.
By carrying out such simulations runs for many values of t0, the model pro-
duces a relationship between N and t0: Figure 7 presents some statistics from a
series of such runs with N varying from near zero to about 22800. (The first de-
parture time ranges between zero and 8000.) The upper panel plots the maximal
queue length against total traffic N . Kinks are evident, due not only to capacity
thresholds but also to transitions to new regimes, such as the beginning of Regime
3 at aboutN=11200. The lower panel plots the resulting average cost as a function
of N ; this curve is convex and we conjecture that convexity is inevitable.
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Figure 6: Simulation run: cumulative departures and arrivals given t0 =  5000
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Figure 7: Simulation runs: maximal queue length (upper panel) and average cost
(lower panel) as functions of N
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7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have formulated an analytically tractable model of hypercon-
gestion that is consistent with some new results from traffic engineering. The
model relies of course on some stringent assumptions. Probably the most im-
portant such assumptions are that travelers are homogeneous in preferences and
travel distances; that the system is deterministic, with no uncertainty arising from
accidents or other sources of unexpected congestion; and that capacity depends
on network occupancy through a simple step function. Nevertheless, the model
leads to several insights that appear to depend on general features that would likely
remain even if those assumptions were relaxed.
First, the average cost for travelers in unregulated equilibrium is increasing
and convex as a function of traffic volume. The slope of the average cost curve is
related to the lowest capacity activated, but the relationship is not simple due to
the forces of equilibrium that partly compensate for lower capacity by reducing
the departure rate.
Second, there are two sources of benefit associated with tolling: the familiar
source from the Vickrey bottleneck model, namely that queueing can be reduced
without affecting travelers’ inclusive price; and a new source due to eliminating or
reducing the time during which capacity is reduced. This new source also applies
to a metering policy, which has not previously been analyzed in the context of
a single bottleneck. It can be very large if the unregulated equilibrium involves
severe hypercongestion.
Third, in contrast to the Vickrey bottleneck model, this model allows analy-
sis of metering as a policy instrument even for a single bottleneck. Metering can
be used to avoid the reduction of capacity, thereby achieving the second of the
benefits associated with tolling. Importantly, the benefit accrues directly to trav-
elers; there is no intervening step in which revenue has to be collected and used
beneficially.
Fourth, like the ideal time-varying toll, a coarse toll (one that varies in discrete
steps) also leads to the benefits both from queue reduction and from avoided ca-
pacity reduction. Furthermore, application of such a toll enables a substantially
larger traffic volume to be sustained without activating capacity reduction.
Our model opens further possibilities for analyzing new classes of policies that
could not be analyzed with such explicit attention to scheduling. One, already dis-
cussed, is metering. Another consists of measures designed to change the capacity
function, for example increased enforcement of regulations against blocking in-
tersections and increased storage space on turn lanes to prevent spillbacks. These
latter policies are frequently included in congestion management strategies, and
our model offers a way to analyze their systemic effects by changing the queue
threshold Q0 at which the lower capacity is activated.
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Tractability is the main challenge for models that deal with hypercongestion,
because the travel time of one traveler is determined by the decisions of other trav-
elers throughout the duration of the trip. Thus, generalizing to situation with more
general scheduling preferences, heterogeneous travelers, travel-time uncertainty,
and more realistic capacity functions will be difficult. It may be such generaliza-
tions will have to rely on simulation rather than on analytical results. It is also
possible that more radical deviations from the current model framework may turn
out to be fruitful. For example, one could consider equilibrium concepts other
than Nash equilibrium, or abandon the first-in-first-out principle.
What seems certain is that hypercongestion is a significant phenomenon at the
macroscopic level in real cities. Acknowledging and better understanding hyper-
congestion are fundamental to the assessment of policies that address congestion.
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A Unregulated solution: Regimes 2 and 3
As shown in the text, the queue will reach length Q0 if N  N1. This appendix
establishes some properties of equilibrium in this case.
In these regimes, times tM , tdrop and tlift are defined by:
a (tM) = 0
a (tdrop) = inf ftjQ (t)  Q0g
a (tlift) = inf ftjt > a (tdrop) ; Q (t) < Q0g :
We begin by establishing some general properties of equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Suppose N > N1. Then: (a) Capacity drops before and lifts after the
departure that arrives just on time: i.e. a (tdrop)  tM  a (tlift); and (b) The
times when the queue exceeds the threshold Q0 form a single continuous interval.
Proof. (a) Considering the first inequality of part (a), suppose otherwise that there
is a t such that tM < t < a (tdrop) : The t can be chosen such that the queue
is increasing at time t; since the queue reaches Q0 for the first time at a (tdrop) :
But a0 (t) < 1 since t > tM : Hence Q0 (t) = [a0 (t)  1] 0 < 0; which is a
contradiction.
Considering the second inequality, suppose otherwise that there is a t such
that a (tlift) < t < tM : This t can be chosen sufficiently close to a (tlift) that
the queue is decreasing at time t. But a0 (t) > 1 since t < tM . Hence Q0 (t) =
[a0 (t)  1] 0 > 0, a contradiction.
(b) From consumer equilibrium, the queue must be rising for arrivals at times
a (t) < tM , and falling for times a (t) > tM . From (a), this means the queue is
first rising then falling between times a (tdrop) and a (tlift), so remains above Q0
throughout this interval. Also, it is rising before a (tdrop) and falling after a (tlift),
so cannot be above Q0 at any other time.
Note that tlift may occur either before or after a (tdrop). These possibilities
distinguish regimes 2 and 3. Finding the times that characterize these two regimes
requires solving some equations. We consider regime 2 first.
A.1 Regime 2
Recalling Lemma 1, regime 2 is defined by the following ordering of times.
t0 < tdrop < tlift < a (tdrop) < tM < a (tlift) <  

t0  t1.
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This order is sufficient to identify the changes in R and Q that occur in intervals
between these points.
We can find a (tlift) in terms of t0 as follows. During the interval [a (tlift) ; t1]
a number [t1   a (tlift)] a0L 0 of travelers depart, during which time the queue
changes by [t1   a (tlift)] (a0L   1) 0. This change must equal  Q0 in order that
the queue be reduced from Q0 to zero. Therefore, using t1 =   (=) t0:
 Q0 = [t1   a (tlift)] (a0L   1) 0
[t1   a (tlift)] =  + 

 Q0
 0
a (tlift) =  

t0    + 

 Q0
 0
: (19)
Next we may use the condition that the queue length is identical at a (tdrop) and
a (tlift) in order to find a (tdrop). We do this by breaking this time interval into its
two parts, each with its own departure rate and and an arrival rate equal to  1, and
setting the cumulative change in queue equal to zero:
0 = [tM   a (tdrop)] (a0E 0    1) + [a (tlift)  tM ] (a0L 0    1)
= (a0E   a0L) 0


t0   (a0E 0    1) a (tdrop) + (a0L 0    1) a (tlift) .
Solving, substituting (19), and simplifying yields:
a (tdrop) =
a0E   a0L
a0E 0    1
 0


t0 +
a0L 0    1
a0E 0    1
a (tlift)
=

a0E   a0L
a0E 0    1
 0


  a
0
L 0    1
a0E 0    1



t0   a
0
L 0    1
a0E 0    1
  + 

 Q0
 0
=
"
 0    + 0
 +  1
  
 
+
 0      1
 +  1


#
t0  
 
+
 0      1
 +  1
  ( + )

 Q0
 0
=


 (   )  +  0
 +  1
t0     

     1
 +  1
 Q0
 0
(20)
where    0    1.
Using these results, we can identify the relationship between N and t0 by not-
ing that arrival rate A (t), which has kinks at a (tdrop) and a (tlift), must integrate
to N :
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N = (a (tdrop)  t0) 0 + (a (tlift)  a (tdrop)) 1 + (t1   a (tlift)) 0
= [a (tdrop)  a (tlift)]     + 

t0 0
=


 0

 
 +  1
  1

t0 +
 ( + )

 
 +  1
Q0
=   01

 t0 + 

 
 +  1
Q0
This equation is solved for t0 to yield equation (6) in the text.
Lemma 2 The slope
 01   0
(  )  +  1
 +  1
of average cost as a function of N in Regime 2 satisfies  1   01   0.
Proof. The second inequality is obvious. The first inequality is equivalent to
 1 <  0
(  ) 0 + (2   ) 1
 +  1
,  
 0
+ 
 1
 0
< (  )  0
 1
+ 2   
, 

2   1
 0
   0
 1

< 

2   1
 0
   0
 1

But it can easily be verified that the function f (x) = 2  x  x 1  0 for x > 0
and that f (x) = 0 only for x = 1. If  1 <  0, the first inequality is equivalent
to  > , which we have assumed throughout. If  1 =  0, the definition of  01
shows directly that  0 =  01.
The time tlift itself can be found from the fact that the number of departures
during time interval [tlift; t1] is equal to the number of arrivals during [a(tlift); t1].
Breaking the first of these intervals into its two parts with different departure rates,
this equality is written:
a0E 0  [tM   tlift] + a0L 0  [t1   tM ] =  0  [t1   a (tlift)]
from which, using (19) along with earlier results for tM and t1:
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tlift = tM +
a0L
a0E
 [t1   tM ]  1
a0E

 + 

 Q0
 0

=



1    


t0   (  ) ( + )

 Q0
 0
. (21)
Note that this derivation does not depend on the relative positions of a (tdrop) and
tlift, so remains valid in Regime 3.
We can now demonstrate that the times a (tdrop) and tlift approach each other
as N increases, and equal each other at the critical value given in Section 3.3 of
the text. Combining (21) and (20), we find from the coefficients of t0 that:

2
 d
dt0
[tlift   a (tdrop)] = 1   0
 +  1
=
(   ) 1
 +  1
< 0.
Given then dt0=dN < 0 from (6), we therefore know that d [tlift   a (tdrop)] =dN >
0 during Regime 2:
We can furthermore find the threshold N2 for which tlift = a (tdrop), marking
the boundary between Regimes 2 and 3, as the value for which tlift = a (tdrop).
Equating (21) and (20), and using (6) to eliminate t0, leads to:
N2  N1
Q0
= 1 +
  

 
 1
as stated in (8) in Section 3.3 of the text. The derivation is tedious but straightfor-
ward, so we did not include it here but it is available on request.
A.2 Regime 3
Regime 3 is characterized by the conditions that
t0 < tdrop < a (tdrop) < tM < a (tlift) <  

t0  t1
a (tdrop) < tlift
The times tdrop and a (tdrop) are simpler to derive than in regime 2. They are
determined by two conditions. First, the number of departures during interval
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[t0; tdrop] (which occur at rate a0E 0) is equal to the number of arrivals during
interval [t0; a (tdrop)] (which occur at rate  0). This yields:
a (tdrop)  t0 = 
   (tdrop   t0) : (22)
Second, the critical queue length Q0, which by definition occurs at time a (tdrop),
is equal to the number of departures between tdrop and a (tdrop). (This is because
everyone already in the queue at time tdrop passes through it by time a (tdrop), by
definition of the latter.) These departures occur at rate a0E 1. Therefore:
Q0 =

    [a (tdrop)  tdrop] 1.
Combining with (22), we obtain
tdrop   t0 = Q0
 1
(  )2

(23)
and hence
a (tdrop)  t0 = Q0
 1
(  )

.
This enables us to see how [tlift   a (tdrop)] varies withN for this regime, just
as we did for Regime 2. Combining the above equation with (21), which as noted
remains valid in this regime, we see from the coefficients of t0 that:
d
dt0
[tlift   a (tdrop)] = 


1    


  1
=
( + ) (   )

< 0.
As with Regime 2, this implies that [tlift   a (tdrop)] is increasing in N ; since it
begins at zero for N = N2, it must be greater than zero for N > N2, as stated in
the text.
To determine the relationship between N and t0, we combine (19) with (22)
to obtain:
a(tlift)  a(tdrop) = (t1   t0)   + 

 Q0
 0
  Q0
 1
(  )

=  

t0  

1
 0
  + 

+
1
 1
(  )


Q0
=  

t0  

 + 

+
 0
 1
(  )


Q0
 0
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We then integrate A0 from t0 to t1, making use of the fact that (19) from Regime
2 applies also in this regime since it was derived from the arrival rate aftertime
a (tlift). The result is:
N =  0  [a (tdrop)  t0] +  1  [a (tlift)  a (tdrop)] +  0  [t1   a (tlift)]
=
 0
 1
(  )

Q0   

 1t0  

 + 

 1
 0
+
(  )


Q0 +
 + 

Q0
=  

 1t0 +

 0
 1
  1

  

+

1   1
 0

 + 


Q0
=  

 1t0 +
 
 0 1

(  )

 0 +
 + 

 1

Q0.
Solving for t0 yields (10).
B Coarse toll
We need to determine when the system with coarse toll (17), applied during the
optimal interval [t+; t ] given by (15) and (16), satisfies the requirement that the
queue never exceed Q0.
First, consider the queue faced by travelers paying the toll. Travelers in the
tolled group arriving exactly at the preferred arrival time experience the maxi-
mum queue in this group. To be in equilibrium with non-toll payers, whose aver-
age cost isN= 0, the time spent queueing must be worthN= 0  ; that is, the
queue duration must be (N= 0    ) =: With a processing rate of  0; the max-
imum queue length in the tolled group is then Qmaxtoll ( ) = (N    0 ) = =
N=(2).
Next, consider the early group of non-tolled travelers. They depart starting
at time t0 at a rate greater than capacity. Their queue is steadily increasing and
reaches its maximum as they approach their last departure time, which is a 1 (t+),
i.e., the departure time allowing them to arrive just at time t+ when the toll kicks.
To find a 1 (t+) ; we make use of three conditions:
1. Their departure rate is E = a0E 0, from (4), with a0E = = (  );
2. The earliest departure is t0 =  N= ( 0), from the condition that the first
traveler has cost N= 0, as stated above (15);
3. The total number of departures in the early group, E  [(a 1 (t+)  t0)] ;
equals the total number of arrivals from this group,  0  (t+   t0).
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Using these three conditions and substituting (15) for t+ and (17) for  , we
obtain a departure interval of duration
tE  a 1 (t+)  t0 = 1
a0E 0
 N
2
Over the interval of departures, then, cumulative departures are
EtE =
N
2
while cumulative arrivals during that same time interval are
 0tE =
N
2
 1
a0E
.
The difference is the maximum queue:
Qmaxearly (
) =
N
2
,
showing that Qmaxearly ( ) = Qmaxtoll ( ).
Consider now late travelers who pay no toll. They begin departures at some
time tlate0 with corresponding arrival at time t : Both tolled and late untolled
travelers depart at rate a0L 0  [= ( + )] 0 during this period. Thus the com-
bined departure rate for tolled and late travelers is L = [2= ( + )] 0, hence
their queue changes at rate (L    0)= 0 = [2= ( + )  1] 0. But  <  by
assumption, so this rate is negative, that is, the queue is dissipating.
So with the optimal coarse toll and capacity at  0; the maximal queue is
N=(2) = (1=2)Q0 (N=N1) ; and the maximum is attained both by early and
tolled travelers. Therefore the system remains in Regime 1, and hence solution
(17) is valid, providedN  2N1: To put the result another way, the optimal coarse
toll makes it possible to accommodate twice as many travelers without activating
the lower capacity as is the case with an unregulated equilibrium. This completes
the needed proof for Section 4.3.
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C List of Symbols
A Cumulative arrivals
a (t) Arrival time for departure at time t
a0E = (  )
a0L = ( + )
N Total number of travelers
Q Queue length (in number of travelers)
Q0 Value of Q at which capacity drops
R Cumulative departures
t Preferred arrival time: normalized to zero
t0 Time of first departure
t1 Time of last departure [=   (=) t0]
tdrop First departure time for which lower capacity is encountered
by end of trip (Regimes 2 and 3 only)
tlift Last departure time for which lower capacity is encountered
by end of trips in (Regimes 2 and 3 only)
tM Departure time leading to arrival at time t [i.e. a 1 (0) =
(=) t0]
 Utility loss per unit of travel time
 Utility loss per unit of early arrival
 Utility loss per unit of late arrival
 = ( + )
 Departure rate (travelers per unit time)
 (Q) Bottleneck capacity as function of Q
 0;  1 Higher, lower values of  , respectively
  0    1
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